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Abstract—Web 2.0 technologies have made it possible to
migrate traditional desktop applications to the Web, resulting in a
rich and dynamic user experience and in expanded functionality.
Individuals can create and manage their content online, and they
are not only consumers of Web services, but also active partic-
ipants in creating, enriching and personalizing these services.
As a result, potentially large amounts of personal, sensitive, and
valuable data is put online, spread across various Web services.
Users willingly share this data with other users and services on
the Web, but are also concerned about maintaining privacy and
keeping their personal data secure.
Currently, users must use diverse access control solutions
available for each Web service to secure data and control its
dissemination. When such mechanisms are used on a daily
basis, they add considerable overhead, especially since these
mechanisms often lack sophistication with respect to functionality
as well as user interfaces. To alleviate this problem, we discuss
in this paper a novel approach to access management for Web
resources that includes a user as a core part of its model. The
proposal puts the user in charge of assigning access authorization
to resources that may be hosted at various Web applications.
It facilitates the ability of users to share data more selectively
using a centralized authorization manager which makes access
decisions based on user instructions. It also supports requesters
in accessing such data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web 2.0 has become a platform supporting all kinds of
interactions, be it business processes or collaboration between
users. This has resulted in many of these interactions and their
associated data being shifted from the real to this environment
[31], [32]. It has also influenced the way people engage
with one another, collaborate, form communities, and share
information. A key trend in Web 2.0 is the inclusion of the
user as a core part of any model [18]. It is the user who creates
data and plays a role as a content publisher. It is also the user
who disseminates this data and who shares it with other users
and services on the Web.
Sharing data in the Web 2.0 environment poses various
security and privacy issues which are commonly addressed
using diverse access control solutions. Such solutions, how-
ever, often lack sophistication, simplicity and usability since
they are a side issue for typical Web 2.0 applications.
Access control mechanisms are often tightly bound to
the application and have limited flexibility in terms of their
configuration or adaptation to a particular user’s security re-
quirements [27], [30]. These mechanisms are configured using
policies that are specified in diverse and often incompatible
policy languages using various tools at every Web application.
This prevents a user from easily monitoring, changing, or stop-
ping access relationships between online services. Moreover,
a user lacks a global view of all their sharing preferences,
patterns and data recipients on the Web.
In order to benefit from the increasing number of services
accessible over the Web, a user is forced to share data
using provided access control mechanisms. As noted by the
Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) movement [5], for
example, a user may need to “hand over” information that
can be sensitive, valuable, and personal and often has to
do it in time-consuming and imprecise ways. By providing
such information to requesting Web services an individual is
paying price in both privacy and convenience. A user then has
limited ability to control access to such information once it
is submitted, and in any case must surrender it under terms
favorable only to its recipients.
Following the highly collaborative Web 2.0 paradigm, there
is a clear need for new approaches to access management
which would allow a user to play a pivotal role in their model.
Such approaches would allow a user to be in full control over
access to their data irrespective of the location of this data.
Moreover, these approaches would allow a user to apply the
necessary security and privacy controls while retaining all the
benefits of social interactions and data sharing that the Web
2.0 environment offers.
In this paper we present a new approach to access control
for Web resources based on the User-Managed Access (UMA)
protocol1. The UMA proposal provides a method for users
to control third-party application access to their protected
resources, residing on any number of host sites, through a
centralized authorization manager that makes access decisions
based on user instructions. This gives users the required
flexibility in sharing their data and supports them in their
participation in interactions and collaboration on the Web. It
also supports potential requesters with accessing a user’s data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
provide a requirements analysis for a user-managed access
control solution in Section II. In Section III, we explain
the User-Managed Access approach to authorization for Web
resources which meets all presented requirements. We evaluate
this approach against these requirements in Section IV. We
1The protocol is being standardized by the User-Managed Access Work
Group (UMA WG). Authors Machulak, Maler, and Catalano hold leadership
positions in this work group.
discuss progress and future work in Section V. We examine
related work in Section VI and we conclude in Section VII.
II. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
New approaches to access control for Web resources should
allow the user to quickly determine what information is shared
with what parties and for what purposes [17], and further, to
control how information is shared. The user should be capable
of determining the trustworthiness of these parties, how the
shared information will be handled, and what the consequences
of sharing this information are. These properties, however, ap-
pear not to be fully covered in existing authorization solutions.
Therefore, there is a need to formulate sound and concise
requirements for a novel access management solution that
would fit precisely into the Web 2.0 environment. These re-
quirements have been initially presented in [41]. They address
the shortcomings of existing access management systems, such
as those based on XACML [8], that we perceive as either
inflexible or insufficiently user-managed. These systems seem
to lack the sophistication, simplicity and usability required to
respond to security and privacy challenges in the highly user-
driven Web environment.
We discuss each of the formulated requirements in more
detail:
1) Access relationship service: A successful user-managed
access control solution should support the notion of a distinct
online service for managing data-sharing and service-access
relationships between an individual and their online services
that request such access.
2) User-driven policies and terms: The solution should
allow an individual to select policies and enforceable contract
terms that govern access, as well as data storage, further usage,
and further sharing on the part of requesting services.
3) User-managed access relationships: It should allow an
individual to conduct short-term and long-term management
of access relationships, including modifying of the conditions
of access or terminating the relationship entirely.
4) Auditing: It should be possible for an individual to audit
and monitor various aspects of access relationships for the
purpose of data sharing analytics.
5) Requester-Host direct access: The access control solu-
tion should allow requesting services to interact directly with
hosting services in a fashion guided by policy without the user
being involved in these interactions. Real-time user approval
should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances.
6) Multiple hosting services: Requesting services should be
able to interact with multiple data hosting services associated
with the same individual.
7) Entity separation: A user should be able to store re-
sources at a host in one Web domain and protect these
resources with an access relationship service residing in a
different domain. Correspondingly, the requester could reside
in a different domain as well.
8) Resource orientation: User data access and service ac-
cess should be enabled through accessing Web resources that
have URLs.
Fig. 1. Interactions between entities involved in the User-Managed Access
(UMA) protocol.
9) Representation agnostic access control: The access re-
lationship service should not be required to understand the
representations of resources it is charged with protecting. As
such, the functionality of this service should be applicable to
arbitrary resources on the Web.
10) Preservation of user’s privacy: For resources at hosting
service X and resources at hosting service Y, neither X nor Y
should be able to find out, through their relationship with the
access relationship service, that the same individual uses the
other service.
In the next section, we discuss a new access control solution
for Web resources that meets all formulated requirements.
III. APPROACH
User-Managed Access (UMA) to Web resources is a novel
access management solution based on a new access control
delegation protocol. This protocol provides a method for users
to control third-party application access to their protected
resources, residing on any number of host sites, through a
centralized authorization manager that makes access decisions
based on user instructions. The protocol is designed to satisfy
requirements presented in Section II and formulated in [41].
A high-level view of entities involved in UMA is depicted in
Fig. 1.
The UMA proposal consists of a dedicated service for au-
thorizing data sharing and service access. The user is capable
of imposing demands on any Web application that wishes to
access a user’s data. Moreover, the user is able to monitor,
change, and stop access relationships between online services
from one location. With a specialized component being in
charge of relationships, the user does not have to manually
provide data to requesting services. Instead, the user may
provide authoritative sources from which Web services can
request such data directly in a secure and efficient way.
The UMA protocol has been researched by the User-
Managed Access Work Group (UMA WG) [42]. It has been
initially proposed in [22] and defined in [21] but has since
undergone significant modifications regarding the adoption
of the OAuth Web Resource Authorization Profiles (WRAP)
[14]. We discuss how WRAP fits into our model throughout
the paper. Additionally, we show WRAP-based interactions
between entities of the UMA architecture in Fig. 2.
A. Architecture
As shown in Fig. 1, User-Managed Access is based on four
main entities: Authorizing User, Authorization Manager, Host,
and Requester. We provide a brief overview of each of these
entities in subsequent sections. For a more detailed explanation
of these terms we refer the reader to [40] and [6].
1) Authorizing User: An Authorizing User delegates access
control from their chosen set of Hosts to an Authorization
Manager. Such a user is also responsible for configuring an
Authorization Manager with policies that control how this
component makes access decisions when a Requester attempts
to access a Protected Resource at a Host, thus serving as their
own policy administrator.
2) Authorization Manager: An Authorization Manager
(AM) acts on behalf of an Authorizing User. It evaluates access
requests made by a Requester against applicable policies,
issuing Access Tokens necessary to make authorized access
requests to Protected Resources at a Host. An Authorization
Manager may also evaluate such tokens in case a Host chooses
not to evaluate them locally. Therefore, an AM acts as a
Policy Administration Point (PAP) and a Policy Decision Point
(PDP), as defined in [43], and plays the conceptual role of a
Security Token Service as defined in [19].
3) Host: A Host is a Web application that is used by an
Authorizing User to store and manage Protected Resources
and to share these resources with specific Requesters. A
Host delegates access control to an Authorization Manager
following configuration by an Authorizing User. A Host is then
concerned with enforcing access control decisions issued by
an Authorization Manager. Therefore, a host acts as a Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP).
4) Requester: A Requester is an application that interacts
with a Host in order to get access to a Protected Resource,
which can be accomplished after it interacts with an AM
to obtain an Access Token. A Requester is controlled by a
Requesting Party that can be a person or a company that uses
such an application to seek protected resource access on their
own behalf.
For example, a Web user (Authorizing User) can arrange to
authorize an online service to gain one-time or ongoing access
to a set of personal data including his home address stored at
a personal data service (Host). A user can achieve that by
instructing the host to check with his authorization decision-
making service (Authorization Manager). The requesting party
might be an e-commerce company whose site is acting on
behalf of the user himself to assist him in arranging for
shipping a purchased item, or it might be his friend who is
using an online address book service to collect addresses, or
it might be a survey company that uses an online service to
compile population demographics. We discuss an extensive set
of use cases with various settings of the proposed entities of
the UMA solution in [7].
B. Delegation Protocol
The User-Managed Access protocol describes interactions
between all of the previously defined entities. It consists of
the following steps, which are currently defined as extensions
and profiles of the WRAP protocol [14] while the OAuth V2.0
protocol [4] is under development: (1) User registers host at
AM, (2) Requester gets access token from AM, (3) Requester
wields access token at host to gain access (Fig. 2). For the
sake of completeness, we also describe how a user may define
access control policies at AM for resources stored at a host.
The protocol, however, does not impose any constraints on
how this step should be performed.
1) User registers host at AM: In this step a user estab-
lishes a trust relationship between a host and an authorization
manager (Fig. 3). This can be achieved by providing the
location of a user’s preferred AM to a host. For example, an
authorizing user may provide the URL of their AM to a host
Web application by typing it into a text field on a Web page
or transmitting through an information card.
When a host is provisioned with the location of the AM
then it uses the host-meta discovery mechanism [11] to obtain
a metadata document from the AM. Such a document defines
the location of a user authorization URL, an access token
URL, and a token validation URL. It also defines access token
formats and claim formats that this AM generates. We refer
the reader to [6] for examples of such a metadata document.
The user authorization URL is used by a host to initiate
the process of acquiring authorization to use a particular AM.
The access token URL is used by a host to obtain an access
token for this AM. A host provides this URL to requesters so
they can acquire access tokens necessary to access protected
resources on this host. The token validation URL can be used
by the host to validate access tokens received from requesters.
When a host receives the metadata document from the
AM, it then uses one of the user delegation profiles (e.g.
Web App Profile), as defined in the WRAP specification [14],
to obtain the user’s authorization to use this AM. This is
achieved by receiving an access token authorized by a user
from an authorization manager. This token allows a host to
make authorized access requests to the AM. We discuss access
tokens in more detail when describing step (2) of the UMA
protocol.
A host may delegate access control to the AM for all its
resources, for resources of a particular user or for a specific
subset of resources only. This, however, is implementation
specific and the protocol itself supports all three granularity
levels of access control delegation.
At the end of this step, a host is capable of making
authorized access requests to the AM in order to validate
access requests to protected resources issued by requesters.
Fig. 2. High-level overview of the User-Managed Access protocol.
Fig. 3. UMA Step 1: User registers Host at AM.
User defines access control policies at AM: The UMA
protocol does not impose any constraints on how access
control policies are composed by a user or how a policy is
linked with a resource. The AM may support simple access
control matrix type policies or may provide a variety of
flexible policy languages and policy engines to support policy
composition and evaluation respectively. We envisage that
support for specific policy languages and management tools
may dictate the choice of a specific AM by a user.
UMA purposely does not constrain the policy composition
process in order to support a variety of data sharing scenarios
on the Web. A user may compose policies defining subjects
and their access rights to a user’s resources. Moreover, the
UMA protocol supports the policy-driven ability of an AM
to demand claims from a requester before authorization is
granted. A policy may also require a user’s consent to be
provided in real time. Different examples of policies are
discussed in more detail in [7].
As far as linking a policy to a resource is concerned, a
user may perform this in a variety of ways. We envisage that
a host may provide a typical security-related user interface
(e.g. a “Protect” link). When a user clicks on such a link then
they are redirected to the configured authorization manager to
associate a resource with an access control policy. Similarly,
a user may decide to log in to an AM and manually link a
policy with a resource using provided management tools.
At the end of this step, a set of resources is successfully
associated with one or more access control policies defined by
a user. The AM evaluates access requests issued by a requester
against these policies.
2) Requester gets access token from AM: In order for the
requester to be able to access a protected resource on a host
the access request needs to be accompanied by an access
token. If such a token is missing in the request then a host
responds with a standard “HTTP 401 Unauthorized” response
as defined in [24]. Such response also contains information
about the location of the AM that protects this resource. We
use the “WWW-Authenticate: WRAP” header to specify the
URL of the authorization manager where an access token
can be obtained. The requester may choose not to issue
any unauthorized access requests to a host and may directly
approach the authorization manager to acquire the token if a
location of AM is known in advance to the requester.
Once the requester learns about an access token URL at
AM, it adheres to the WRAP protocol, with a few key UMA
extensions, to obtain an access token for a protected resource
at a host. UMA adopts one of the existing profiles, as defined
in [14], for this step of the protocol. If an authorizing user
acts as a requesting party then it adopts the user delegation
profile. However, if a requesting party is a different person or
a company then it uses one of the autonomous client profiles
with the added semantic that the operator of the client is
different from the authorizing user.
In both cases a requester issues a request to the access token
URL of the AM. Such a request contains information about
the method that the requester wants to execute on a protected
resource and the scope to which access should be granted.
A requester may provide information concerning multiple
methods and multiple scopes at a host. Such information is
a simple URL-encoded JSON object. We refer the reader to
[6] for an example of such an object.
The AM evaluates an access request based on the provided
information. The protocol does not define how the AM per-
forms such an evaluation. The authorization manager may,
for example, use simple rules or a more sophisticated policy
engine to evaluate access requests against applicable policies.
Once the AM decides whether the access request is valid or
not, it may respond to a requester in one of three ways. It can
respond with a successful access response, an unsuccessful
access response or a claims-required document. The first
two responses have been adopted from the WRAP protocol
and conform to those defined in [14]. The UMA protocol
introduces the third option which is used when a user policy
requires that one or more claims must be submitted by a
requester.
Firstly, if the AM has all the required information concern-
ing this particular access request then it may respond with a
successful access response (Fig. 4 a). As defined in [14], such
a response contains an access token and an optional refresh
token.
An access token is a token, generally short-lived, which is
used by a requester to gain access to a protected resource on a
host. The refresh token, on the other hand, can be a long-lived
token that can be used by a requester to subsequently reuse
already obtained authorization and to request fresh access
tokens from AM without the need of repeating the evaluation
process. The time for which both the access and the refresh
tokens are valid can be controlled by a user at AM or can be
determined solely by an AM, and is implementation specific.
Secondly, the AM may decide that a requester is definitively
not authorized to access a particular resource according to a
user’s policy and it then responds with an unsuccessful access
response (Fig. 4 b).
The third case is where a user’s policy specifies required
claims that must be conveyed from a requesting party before
an authorization is granted, such as self- or third-party-asserted
identification, or a promise to adhere to access licensing terms.
In such a case, AM responds with a claims-required response
containing a list of all required claims. Upon receiving these
claims, the AM performs the access request evaluation process
and decides whether authorization can be granted or not. It
may then respond with a successful or unsuccessful access
token response, or with another claims-required response if
more claims are needed (Fig. 4 c).
The User-Managed Access protocol does not define the
Fig. 4. UMA Step 2: Requester gets access token from AM.
format of the claims-required document and the claims them-
selves. We envisage that protocol may use already existing
claim types such as Information Cards [10] or SAML asser-
tions [20]. However, we do see potential shortcomings of these
and other claims specifications and we are currently working
on providing a more flexible way of expressing claims as
discussed further in this section.
At the end of this step, a requester is in a possession
of an access token and an optional refresh token issued an
authorization manager for a specific access type to a protected
resource on a host.
3) Requester wields access token at host to gain access:
This step is executed when a requester has acquired an access
token from an authorization manager. A requester simply
presents such a token when attempting to access a protected
resource on a host as illustrated in Fig. 5.
A host can either choose to evaluate the access token locally
or may use the AM for the evaluation process. In the first case,
it’s the host that decides whether to grant access to a resource
or not, though this must be based on the received access token.
If the token is valid then access to a resource is granted. In
case the token is invalid then a host responds with an “HTTP
401 Unauthorized” response that contains information about
the location of the AM that protects this resource (recall step
(2) of the protocol).
In case a host decides to use the AM for the validation
process, it then sends the token to the AM’s token validation
URL. This request for validation is accompanied by a host’s
own access token previously acquired in step (1) of the UMA
protocol. Additionally, a host sends information regarding the
resource on which access is being attempted and the method
of requested access. The AM may respond in two ways to a
host: the token is valid, or the token is invalid. Based on the
AM’s response, a host allows or rejects the access request.
The UMA WG is also researching a hybrid token validation
model where AM dynamically provisions a host with the
Fig. 5. UMA Step 3: Requester wields access token at host to gain access.
ability to do local token validation. Such approach would
address performance issues related to remote token validation.
After this step of the protocol, a requester gains authorized
access to a protected resource or is denied access to a resource
if the presented access token is invalid. In the latter case, a
requester is free to seek authorization or to refresh its access
token at AM using the previously acquired refresh token or
by other means specified in the chosen WRAP profile.
C. Claims
The User-Managed Access protocol does not constrain
users in composing access control policies for their protected
resources (subject to AM implementation limitations). Hence,
a user may specify policies defining required claims which
must be submitted by a requester before authorization can be
granted. These claims may refer to data storage, further usage,
and further sharing on the part of requesting services.
Submitted claims may be affirmative, representing a state-
ment of fact. An affirmative claim can be asserted by a
requesting party or another claims issuer (e.g. can be signed
by a third-party service). A statement of fact might be “The
requesting party is over 18 years of age.” A claim can be
also promissory and can be asserted by the requesting party
specifically to the authorizing user. For example, such claim
may state that “The requesting party will adhere to the specific
Creative Commons licensing terms indicated by the AM.” We
envisage that the process of demanding and submitting claims
would have legal enforceability consequences as necessary.
The User-Managed Access protocol, as previously dis-
cussed, does not depend on any specific claim type that a
requester may need to submit to an authorization manager.
The protocol can make use of already established types such
as these proposed in [23], [20], [10], [9], and [13]. However,
some of these types are too complex and therefore not well-
suited for Web 2.0-style implementations, and all these types
appear to lack the ability to specify required parameter values
in claims; thus they may be unable to satisfy complex use
cases such as these discussed in [7]. Therefore, the UMA WG
plans to define a new simple and extensible claim type that
would fit precisely into the needs of User-Managed Access.
This prototype would use JSON as its format and would allow
for parameterized claims to be defined.
IV. EVALUATION
The proposed User-Managed Access architecture and del-
egation protocol meet all of the requirements described in
Section II. Requirement (1) is satisfied by including an au-
thorization manager within our architecture and by allowing
authorizing users to delegate access control from hosts to this
specialized component.
An authorizing user can be involved in all the steps of access
control policy management such as those given in [8]. It is the
user that applies access control policies to their distributed set
of Web resources and grants authorizations to requesters of
these resources. The UMA proposal does not constrain how
a user defines access control policies. It supports the policy-
driven ability to demand “claims” which may govern access, as
well as data storage, further usage and sharing by requesters.
Moreover, the user is able to monitor, change, and stop access
relationships between their online services. Hence, the UMA
proposal meets requirements (2), (3) and (4) respectively.
A requester is able to access protected resources only when
wielding an access token issued by an authorization manager
that protects these resources. The step of obtaining such a
token does not oblige a user to be directly involved in these
interactions (unless the user chooses policies that demand their
consent in real time) and it therefore satisfies requirement
(5). Additionally, a requester is free to obtain more than one
access token to access protected resources on different hosts
associated with the same authorizing user. This property of
the UMA proposal meets requirement (6).
All of the entities of the proposed architecture can reside
in distinct Web domains. Interactions between these entities
are based on the standard HTTP protocol and conform to
the REST architectural style [25] to the extent possible.
This makes the User-Managed Access approach satisfy the
formulated requirement (7). Moreover, the described solution
is agnostic as to the identifiers used in an individual’s various
Web services making it possible to be deployed in “today’s
Web”. Additionally, it does not impose any constraints on
what resources may be protected by an authorization man-
ager. These properties of the discussed UMA solution satisfy
requirements (8) and (9) respectively.
An authorizing user may establish a trust relationship be-
tween multiple hosts and a single authorization manager. In
the presented approach, none of these hosts can recognize
that an individual has established a trust relationship between
a different host and the same AM and is therefore using a
particular service on the Web. As such, the User-Managed
Access protocol preserves the user’s privacy, which meets the
formulated requirement (10).
V. PROGRESS AND FUTURE WORK
We have described the User-Managed Access approach to
authorization for Web resources. UMA addresses shortcom-
ings that are present in other solutions to access control and
aims to solve the problems identified in an extensive set
of scenarios discussed in [7]. Moreover, it meets all of the
requirements presented in Section II.
The UMA proposal is being researched by the User-
Managed Access Work Group [42] (operating at the Kantara
Initiative under the charter at [3]). The aim of this work group
is to develop a set of draft specifications for the protocol, and
to facilitate the development of interoperable implementations
of these specifications. The described protocol has been al-
ready produced as a draft specification [6] and the end result
of the Kantara process is planned to be submitted to IETF [1].
We plan to empirically test the UMA protocol using mul-
tiple independent implementations [39]. One of the authors is
currently working on an open source prototype Java implemen-
tation under the Student-Managed Access to Online Resources
(SMART) project [36] funded by JISC [2]. The project will
develop an UMA-compliant access control solution, deploy it
within Newcastle University and evaluate the entire system
through user studies. Another UMA group participant also
plans to have an open source C# implementation of the
protocol jointly conducted by Technical University of Munich
and Fraunhofer Institute of Secured Information Technology.
The User-Managed Access group is actively collaborating
with other efforts aiming to provide new approaches to autho-
rization for Web resources such as the OAuth WG [4]. The
group is continuously gathering use cases for its protocol in
order to formulate further sound and concise requirements that
the protocol must satisfy. The group also works on specifying
design principles that the protocol should meet.
VI. RELATED WORK
Access control systems for the Web have been researched
extensively and aim to address mostly flexibility [16] or us-
ability [15] challenges. These systems, however, do not appear
to be well-suited to the increasingly user-driven Web 2.0 envi-
ronment with an ever-growing number of resources. Recently
proposed solutions aim to fit into such an environment by
empowering users with more control over access rights to
their data. More notable works include those discussed in [28],
[37], [38], [26], [35] and [34]. In this section we provide
an overview of related work that has either influenced or
contributed to the User-Managed Access proposal.
OAuth [12] is one of the early proposals to address autho-
rization between Web services that attracted much attention
in the Web community. It allows a Resource Owner to share
data between two Web applications, one being a Server and
the other being a Client. Access to data is authorized by a
Resource Owner at the Server side which results in an access
token being issued to a Client. As a result, a Client does not
learn credentials of a Resource Owner and is able to make
authorized access requests to resources at a Server using this
acquired token.
With tokens being used for accessing protected resources,
OAuth addresses the password anti-pattern [33], i.e. a user
does not have to reveal their credentials to give one service
access to protected resources hosted at a different service. Each
OAuth service provider, however, must independently serve an
authorization management function without the possibility of
centralized management, defeating requirement (1) as defined
in Section II. Therefore, this specification is unable to address
data sharing scenarios presented in [7].
The OAuth Web Resource Authorization Profiles (WRAP)
[14] is a less complex attempt to solve the problem of autho-
rization for Web resources that has been recently submitted to
OAuth V2.0 work in IETF. WRAP allows a Web application,
called a Protected Resource, to delegate authorization to a
trusted authority called an Authorization Server. A Client,
when seeking access to a Protected Resource, must first obtain
an access token from an Authorization Server and present
this token along with an access request. However, WRAP
leaves unspecified how a Protected Resource comes to trust
an Authorization Server, and does not allow for demanding
claims from Clients. This defeats requirements (3) and (2)
respectively that are discussed in Section II.
The User-Managed Access protocol currently relies on
the WRAP protocol for its interactions between entities of
the proposed architecture. It builds on two instances of this
protocol to meet formulated requirements [41] and to satisfy
investigated scenarios of sharing information on the Web [7].
We show how WRAP fits into the UMA model for access
management for Web resources in Fig. 2.
A similar approach to User-Managed Access is discussed
in [30]. The proposed system, called User-Managed Access
Control (UMAC), has been initially described in [29] and
consists of an architecture of services and an access control
protocol defining interactions between these services. A user
may delegate access control from their set of Web applications
to a specialized component and apply security requirements to
all of their Web resources using this component.
The described architecture and protocol are closely re-
lated to the User-Managed Access solution and have been
researched virtually in parallel with our work. The authors of
UMAC have adopted the terminology proposed by the UMA
WG for their architecture. The discussed protocol, however, is
based on redirections where a host can refer a requester to the
authorization component without any discovery mechanisms.
It also uses remote token validation which has been only re-
cently adopted by UMA in favour of polling the authorization
state of a requester from AM. A more detailed analysis of
both UMA and UMAC solutions is presented in [30].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the need for new approaches to access
management for Web resources that would include a user as
a core part of their model. Additionally, we have discussed
the requirements for such approaches. We have presented the
User-Managed Access solution and described its architecture
and access control delegation protocol. We have then evaluated
the UMA solution to show that it satisfies all discussed
requirements.
The UMA approach provides a method for users to control
third-party application access to their protected resources,
residing on any number of host sites and to introduce those
hosts dynamically to a user-chosen authorization manager
that makes access decisions based on user instructions. UMA
aims to allow users to flexibly apply the necessary security
and privacy controls while retaining all the benefits of social
interactions and data sharing in the Web 2.0 environment.
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